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Abstract 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine Habermas’s account of the 
transformation of the public sphere in modern society. More specifically, 
the study aims to demonstrate that, whilst Habermas’s approach succeeds 
in offering useful insights into the structural transformation of the public 
sphere in the early modern period, it does not provide an adequate theoretical 
framework for understanding the structural transformation of public spheres 
in late modern societies. To the extent that the gradual differentiation of 
social life manifests itself in the proliferation of multiple public spheres, a 
critical theory of public normativity needs to confront the challenges posed 
by the material and ideological complexity of late modernity in order to 
account for the polycentric nature of advanced societies. With the aim of 
showing this, the paper is divided into three sections. The first section 
elucidates the sociological meaning of the public/private dichotomy. The 
second section scrutinizes the key features of Habermas’s theory of the 
public sphere by reflecting on (i) the concept of the public sphere, (ii) the 
normative specificity of the bourgeois public sphere, and (iii) the structural 
transformation of the public sphere in modern society. The third section 
explores the most substantial shortcomings of Habermas’s theory of the 
public sphere, particularly its inability to explain the historical emergence 
and political function of differentiated public spheres in advanced societies. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he main purpose of this paper is to examine Habermas’s account 
of the transformation of the public sphere in modern society 
(see, in  particular,  Habermas ([1962]  1989;  1992;  and  1995).  
In the light of Habermas’s communication-theoretic analysis 
of historical development, the transformation of the public sphere in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries cannot be dissociated from the rise of 
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the modern era. This paper aims to demonstrate that, although Habermas’s 
approach succeeds in offering useful insights into the structural 
transformation of the public sphere in the early modern period, it does not 
provide an adequate theoretical framework for understanding the structural 
transformation of public spheres in late modern societies. The gradual 
differentiation of late modern social life manifests itself in the proliferation of 
multiple public spheres, and hence a critical theory of public normativity 
needs to face up to the challenges posed by the material and ideological 
complexity of late modernity in order to account for the polycentric nature 
of advanced societies. 
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section briefly elucidates 
the sociological meaning of the public/private dichotomy. Given that the 
distinction between the public and the private is of central importance in 
social and political thought, it is worth shedding light on its normative 
significance. The second section scrutinizes the key features of Habermas’s 
theory of the public sphere by reflecting on (i) the concept of the public sphere, 
(ii) the normative specificity of the bourgeois public sphere, and (iii) the 
structural transformation of the public sphere in modern society. The third 
section explores the most substantial shortcomings of Habermas’s theory of 
the public sphere, notably its inability to explain the historical emergence 
and political function of differentiated public spheres in advanced societies. 
  
 
I. THE PUBLIC / PRIVATE DICHOTOMY 
 
 
To reiterate, the main purpose of this paper is to examine Habermas’s 
account of the transformation of the public sphere in modern society. Before 
analyzing the Habermasian approach to the public sphere in more detail in the 
second and third sections of this essay, this introduction shall be concerned 
with the distinction between the public and the private sphere, which is 
generally referred to as the “public/private dichotomy” (see, for example, 
Butt & Langdridge 2003, Condren 2009, Cutler 1997, Geuss 2001, 
Ossewaarde 2007, Rabotnikof 1998, Steinberger 1999, and Weintraub & 
Kumar 1997).   
(i) The Historicity of the Public / Private Dichotomy 
 
The historicity of the public/private dichotomy manifests itself in the 
various meanings attached to the notions of the private and the public in 
different societal contexts. “The Enlightenment category thus is different 
from its classical Greek ancestor, just as it is different from its transformed 
contemporary descendant” (Calhoun 1992b: 6). In ancient Greek thought, the 
distinction between the private and the public was used to indicate the way 
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in which society was divided clearly into two different spheres. According 
to this view, the sphere of the polis was strictly separated from the sphere 
of the oikos: whereas the former described a public sphere based on open 
interactions between free citizens in the political realm, the latter designated 
a private sphere founded on hidden interactions between free individuals in 
the domestic realm (see Habermas [1962] 1989: 3). 
Whilst, at first glance, these two spheres might have appeared to be relatively 
autonomous, they were in fact mutually dependent: the power structures of the 
private sphere were intimately intertwined with the power structures of the 
public sphere. “Status in the polis was...based upon status as the unlimited 
master of an oikos” (ibid.). Hence, just as the freedom of autonomous citizens 
in the public sphere rested on their private autonomy as masters of their 
domestic environment, the autonomy of masters in the domestic sphere 
reinvigorated their freedom in the public sphere. Paradoxically, the relative 
autonomy of the private and the public was contingent upon their reciprocal 
determinacy. Given the structural interdependence of the two spheres, the 
public/private polarity can be conceived of as a public/private reciprocity. The 
socio-historical analysis of the public/private dichotomy is essential in that 
it enables us to explore the material and ideological contingency of the public/ 
private reciprocity, which is rooted in the spatiotemporal specificity of every 
society. 
First, the material contingency of the public/private dichotomy becomes 
evident when analyzing different societal manifestations of its historical 
variability. Different societies produce different forms of public and private life. 
The empirical relationship between the public and the private is malleable and 
thus varies over time and between societies. The spatiotemporal specificity of 
every social reality does not permit us to reduce the public/private dichotomy 
to a pattern of typological universality. Patterns of structural differentiation 
between the public and the private vary between societies. 
Second, the ideological contingency of the public/private dichotomy comes 
to the fore when examining different conceptual representations of its historical 
variability. Different societies produce different discourses about the nature 
of public and private life. The symbolic relationship between the public and 
the private is always reconstructable and hence varies over time and between 
societies. The spatiotemporal specificity of every social ideology does not 
allow us to reduce the public/private dichotomy to a pattern of typological 
universality. The public/private dichotomy is discursively constructed and 
symbolically negotiated in multiple ways. Different conceptions of the world 
create different meanings of the world. Patterns of symbolic differentiation 
between the public and the private vary between societies. 
In short, the malleability of the public/private dichotomy derives from 
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the material and ideological specificity of each society.1 One of the questions 
arising out of a socio-historical understanding of the public/private dichotomy 
can be phrased as follows: What are the main factors which led to the gradual 
transformation of the relation between the public and the private in the 
modern era? Habermas’s answer to this question is that “the development 
of mercantile capitalism in the sixteenth century, together with the changing 
institutional forms of political power, created the conditions for the emergence 
of a new kind of public sphere in early modern Europe” (Thompson 1995: 
69).2 In other words, the profound transformation of the economic and the 
symbolic constitution of society in the modern era triggered the creation of an 
unprecedented public realm. Before examining the key elements of Habermas’s 
analysis of this transformation in more detail, however, it is essential to reflect 
upon the various meanings of the public/private dichotomy. 
 
 
(ii) The Ontology of the Public / Private Dichotomy 
 
In order to understand the ontology of the public/private dichotomy, 
we need to examine what the conceptual separation between the public and 
the private actually represents. What is the normative significance of the 
distinction between the public and the private? Given the socio-historical 
variability of this distinction, we need to acknowledge that the meaning of 
the “great dichotomy” (Somers 2001: 24) between the public and the private is 
multilayered and complex, rather than one-dimensional and straightforward. 
Three different meanings commonly attached to the public/private 
distinction can be identified: society versus individual (“collective” versus 
“personal”), visibility versus concealment (“transparent” versus “opaque”), and 
openness versus closure (“accessible” versus “sealed”). These three meanings 
constitute “heterogeneous criteria” (see Rabotnikof 1998: 3; see also 
Rabotnikof 1997) that have been conceptualized in different ways and used to 
varying degrees in social and political thought. It is therefore important to bear 
in mind that the various meanings of the public/private dichotomy should 
be understood as ideal-typical distinctions. 
The first meaning of the public/private dichotomy refers to a central 
analytical distinction in modern social and political thought: the distinction 
between society and individual. This distinction is often conceived of in terms 
of binary differentiations such as “the social” versus “the individual”, “the 
 
1 The importance of the socio-historical variability underlying the public/private dichotomy 
has been widely acknowledged in the literature. See, for example: Calhoun (1992a: 6), Dahl- 
gren (1995: 7), Goodnight (1992: 243), Habermas ([1962] 1989: 1-2; 1992: 433), Susen (2009b: 
101-102; 2010: 106 and 115), and Thompson (1995: 120). 
2 In this passage, Thompson refers to Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. 
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collective” versus “the personal”, and “the relational” versus “the monadic”. 
By definition, the social sciences in general and sociology in particular tend 
to privilege the former over the latter, for the paradigmatic interest in the 
explanatory power of systematic analyses of “the social” describes the 
ontological cornerstone of social-scientific disciplines. The social sciences 
would be converted into “the sciences of the individual”, and sociology 
would be transformed into “individuology”, if they sought to prove the 
preponderance of the individual over the social. Regardless of the fact that 
the philosophical discrepancies between methodological individualism and 
social holism3 demonstrate that there is considerable room for explanatory 
openness, and notwithstanding the question of how the public/private 
dichotomy is to be interpreted, there is little doubt that the social sciences tend 
to study the individual in terms of the social, rather than the social in terms 
of the individual. Thus, given their concern with the relational constitution of 
reality, the social sciences have a particular interest in studying the ways in 
which human life forms are socially divided into public and private realms. 
The second meaning of the public/private dichotomy has to do with 
another key analytical distinction in modern social and political thought: the 
distinction between visibility and concealment. The controversial nature of this 
distinction arises from the fact that it is far from clear which aspects of social 
life are visible and which concealed. Even more contentious is the question of 
which facets of social life ought to be visible and which ought to be concealed. 
Liberalism―which can be legitimately described as the triumphant ideology 
of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries―has always been deeply 
suspicious of interventionist states and, therefore, critical of authoritarian 
attempts to control people’s private spheres by virtue of the public power of 
the state. It is ironic, then, that in the modern context the idea of the public― 
epitomized in political concepts such as “public power”, “public interest”, 
and “public opinion”―has been used to undermine the arbitrary power of 
potentially authoritarian states. 
 
 
A turning point in modern political life is the battle against a secretive state in 
the name of “public opinion” and “publicity” (Peters 1993: 548). 
 
Hence, it would be analytically naïve and historically ignorant to assume 
that the realm of the state can be identified exclusively with the sphere of 
the visible. To be sure, the state can be regarded as an intrinsically public 
institution in that it represents, or claims to represent, a large-scale group 
of individuals who reside in a territory over which the state enjoys political 
sovereignty. In this sense, the state can be considered as both a legitimated 
 
3 See King (1987: 40) as well as O’Neill (1973: 168). 
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and a legitimating institution whose existence depends on public sovereignty. 
The exercise of this “public” sovereignty, however, can be “private” if the 
internal power structures of the state are systematically concealed by the 
state itself. This applies, first and foremost, to authoritarian, dictatorial, and 
totalitarian states, but also, at least to some extent, to liberal and democratic 
states.4 Whatever the ideological bent of a particular state apparatus, the long- 
term functioning of an efficient and resourceful state rests on the coexistence 
of visible and concealed power structures produced and reproduced by the 
political elite of a given society. 
The third meaning of the public/private dichotomy concerns a further 
analytical distinction in modern social and political thought: the distinction 
between openness and closure. Yet, it should be borne in mind that not all public 
realms are fully “open” and not all private realms are completely “closed”. 
In other words, just as the terms “public” and “open” are not necessarily 
interchangeable, the terms “private” and “closed” are not always mutually 
inclusive. Although the state can undoubtedly be considered as an integral 
component of the public sphere, it is, for that reason, not necessarily open and 
accessible. And although the family can be regarded as an integral component 
of the private sphere, it would be erroneous to assume that it is therefore an 
entirely closed and sealed realm of social life. There is little doubt that all 
states―regardless of whether they are republican or monarchical, liberal or 
socialist, laissez-faire or interventionist, libertarian or totalitarian―require 
a minimal degree of systemic self-referentiality and closure. Similarly, all 
families―regardless of whether they are part of a premodern or modern 
society, primitive or complex division of labour, control-based or freedom- 
based life form, collectivist or individualist culture―require a minimal degree 
of societal embeddedness and openness. 
In brief, the three conceptual pairs commonly attached to the distinction 
between the private and the public are by no means unambiguous and 
straightforward. As a tripartite framework for the study of the public/private 
dichotomy, the aforementioned oppositions can be regarded as central 
reference points in social and political thought. Given the ideal-typical nature 
of the distinction between the private and the public, however, the analytical 
usefulness and explanatory forcefulness of the “grand dichotomy” has to be 
critically examined. Far from representing a dichotomy of irrefutable validity, 
the distinction between the public and the private should be conceived as a 
useful but nevertheless controversial conceptual tool in social and political 
analysis. 
 
 
4 For an insightful analysis of this problem, see Kühnl (1971) and Kühnl (1972). 
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II. HABERMAS’S THEORY OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
This section aims to examine Habermas’s theory of the public sphere. 
In order to do so, the analysis will seek to respond to the following three 
questions: (i) How can the concept of the public sphere be defined? (ii) What 
constitutes the normative specificity of the bourgeois public sphere? (iii) 
What are the main features underlying the structural transformation of the 
public sphere in the modern era? 
 
(i) The Concept of the Public Sphere 
 
As stated above, the concept of the public has a number of different 
meanings.5 Despite the definitional ambiguity of this concept, it is both 
possible and useful to develop an analytical framework which allows us to 
do justice to the complexity of the public sphere in modern society. Even if 
we acknowledge this complexity, however, it is important to bear in mind 
that any attempt to provide a systematic account of the nature of the public 
sphere is unavoidably controversial. 
According to Habermas, “[t]he bourgeois public sphere may be conceived 
above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public” 
(Habermas [1962] 1989: 27). Hence, the public sphere is composed of private 
individuals whose societal interconnectedness transcends the boundaries of 
their personal lives. If the public sphere “is defined as the public of private 
individuals who join in debate of issues bearing on state authority” (Calhoun 
1992b: 7; italics in original), the public sphere and the private sphere can 
be considered mutually inclusive, rather than mutually exclusive, social 
realms. Indeed, the public and the private seem to represent two necessary 
conditions of the social: to the extent that every private person is represented 
by the foreground performativity of a public persona, every public persona is 
embedded in the background subjectivity of a private person. 
Since human actors cannot escape the various socialization processes 
imposed upon them by their environment, the purest form of privacy cannot 
eliminate individuals’ dependence upon society. Individuals can assert their 
privacy only in relation to, rather than in isolation from, the existence of other 
individuals. In this sense, the public sphere is nothing but the socialized 
expression of individuals’ reciprocally constituted autonomy: individuals 
are autonomous not in isolation from but in relation to one another, that is, in 
relation to a public of autonomous beings. 
 
5 Habermas is well aware of this definitional ambiguity. See Habermas ([1962] 1989: 1): “The 
usage of the words ‘public’ and ‘public sphere’ betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings.” 
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From a sociological perspective, “[t]he importance of the public sphere lies 
in its potential as a mode of societal integration” (Calhoun 1992b: 6). The 
coordination of social life cannot be undertaken by completely self-sufficient 
and self-referential individuals who find themselves immersed in hermetically 
sealed and autopoietically sustained private realms. By definition, social 
coordination is carried out by interconnected and interdependent subjects 
who are situated in symbolically negotiated and materially constituted public 
realms. The deliberative organization that takes place in the public sphere 
can be regarded as an expression of the intrinsic sociability of the human 
condition. In fact, there is no societal integration without the existence of a 
public sphere. Just as the existence of each individual cannot be dissociated 
from the existence of society, the existence of the private sphere is inconceivable 
without the existence of the public sphere. 
It is worth mentioning that, in the Anglophone debates on Habermas, 
the concept “public sphere” is based on a fairly imprecise translation of the 
German term Öffentlichkeit.6  Whereas the term Öffentlichkeit literally means 
“publicness” or “publicity”, it is the notion öffentlicher Raum that denotes 
the idea of “public sphere” or “public realm”. Similarly, it should be noted 
that, in the English-speaking literature on Habermas, the concept “structural 
transformation” stems from a somewhat imprecise translation of the German 
term Strukturwandel (see Habermas 1962). Whereas the term Strukturwandel 
literally refers to the “transformation of structure”, it is the notion 
struktureller Wandel that denotes the idea of “structural change”. Thus, the 
emphasis in the German lies on the idea of the transformation of structures in 
the public sphere, rather than on the idea of the structural transformation of 
the public sphere, as the English translation suggests. It is important to 
take this terminological ambiguity, arising from the English translation, into 
account as it obliges us to recognize that Habermas, in his original German 
writings, appears to stress both the structural (Struktur) and the malleable 
(Wandel) constitution of the public. As a collective realm characterized by 
processes of both social reproduction and social transformation, “[t]he 
bourgeois public sphere evolved in the tension-charged field between state 
and society” (Habermas [1962] 1989: 141), that is, in a tertiary realm situated 
between the state “from above” and society “from below”. It is the task of 
the following section to explore the normative specificity of this “tension- 
charged” (ibid.) realm, which is, according to Habermas, firmly situated 
between state and society. 
 
 
 
6  See the original title of Habermas’s influential book on the structural transformation of the 
public sphere: Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen 
Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1962). On this point, see also Peters (1993: 542-543). 
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(ii) The Normative Specificity of the Bourgeois Public Sphere 
 
The normative specificity of the bourgeois  public sphere derives from the 
fact that it possesses an emancipatory potential. To be sure, this is not to 
suggest that the bourgeois public sphere should be idealized as a pristine realm 
of social cooperation and human liberation. Rather, this is to acknowledge 
that its very existence depends on its capacity to promote civic engagement 
in communicative processes of opinion and will formation. The significance of 
Habermas’s insistence on the emancipatory potential of the bourgeois public 
sphere can hardly be overemphasized, as it illustrates the sociological 
importance of the empowering nature of communicative practices performed 
by rational actors. From a Habermasian perspective, subjects capable of 
speech and action7 are also capable of reflection and discourse, because the 
validity claims that linguistic actors raise in everyday communication are, at 
least in principle, always criticizable.8  In the public sphere, the criticizability 
of validity, which is inherent in communicative processes oriented towards 
mutual intelligibility, can be elevated to the status of a coordinative driving 
force of rational sociability. According to Habermas, the discursive nature of 
the bourgeois public sphere manifests itself in three forms of critique: (a) the 
critique of the absolutist state, (b) the critique of the democratic state, and (c) 
the critique of the public sphere as a mediating force between state and society. 
(a) The democratic discourses produced by the bourgeois public sphere 
have always been critical of the arbitrary authority exercised by the absolutist 
state. Given this anti-absolutist stance, the rise of the bourgeois public sphere 
is symptomatic of both the ideological and the material transition from 
premodern to modern society. 
(b) Despite their general alignment with political liberalism, the prevalent 
discourses formed by the bourgeois public sphere are critical of the lawful 
authority exercised by the modern democratic state. Indeed, the bourgeois public 
sphere forms a discursive realm which enables collectively organized individuals 
to act as critical controllers of the democratic state in modern society. 
(c) Paradoxically, the major discourses put forward by the bourgeois public 
sphere are critical not only of the control exercised by the state but also of 
themselves, that is, of the role of democratic discourses in processes of modern 
state formation. The public sphere is both a realm of mutually socializing 
 
7 See, for example: Habermas ([1971] 1988: 9); ([1981a] 1987: 86); ([1981b] 1987: 108); ([1984a] 
2001: 9); ([1984b] 2001: 44); ([1984c] 2001: 118); (2000: 343); (2001: 16, 23-24, 42); (2004: 879). 
8 On Habermas’s insistence on the criticizability of validity claims, see, for example: Habermas 
([1981c] 1987: 287, 305, 308, 333); ([1981d] 1987: 125-126, 137, 139, 149-150); (1982: 269); (2001: 
33, 79, 82-83). On this point, see also: Susen (2007: 76-77, 244, 266) and Susen (2009a: 106). 
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individuals able to create integrative spaces of solidarity and a realm of mutually 
criticizing individuals able to construct discursive spaces of reflexivity. 
Considering the sociological significance of the critical spirit that is the 
hallmark of the bourgeois public sphere, it is worth reflecting on the normative 
implications of these three features in more detail: 
(a) The bourgeois public sphere is unambiguously opposed to premodern 
forms of domination imposed by absolutist states. “The principle of control that 
the bourgeois public opposed to the latter―namely publicity―was intended to 
change domination as such. The claim to power presented in rational-critical 
public debate (öffentliches Räsonnement), which eo ipso renounced the form of 
a claim to rule, would entail, if it were to prevail, more than just an exchange 
of the basis of legitimation while domination was maintained in principle” 
(Habermas [1962] 1989: 28). The rational-critical public is equipped with the 
discursive capacity to question the legitimacy of arbitrary forms of power. 
(b) The bourgeois public sphere extends the particular critique of absolutist 
rule to a general critique of state rule, including the political rule of democratic 
states. Consequently, the rule exercised by the modern state can only claim 
legitimacy to the extent that its existence is made an object of scrutiny by 
virtue of the discursive power of public rationality. According to this view, not 
only arbitrary but also democratic forms of political legitimation are at stake, 
because the very nature of political legitimation is a normative issue discussed 
in modern public spheres. If there is one thing we can take for granted in 
the modern world, it is the fact that nothing can be taken for granted. What 
makes the ideological power of political legitimacy so forceful is that, to the 
extent that it remains unquestioned, it operates behind our backs; what makes 
the critical power of public rationality so forceful is that it permits us to turn 
political legitimacy into an object of scrutiny. Modern citizens can claim “the 
public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, 
to engage them in debate over the general rules governing relations in the 
basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and 
social labor” (ibid.: 27). The rational-critical public debate forms a counter-
controlling control of the authority exercised by the modern state.  
(c) The bourgeois public sphere is critical not only of premodern and modern 
states, but also of itself, for it constitutes an intersubjectively constructed realm 
based on open and reflexive discourses. “It provide[s] the training ground 
for a critical public reflection still preoccupied with itself” (ibid.: 29; italics 
added). The self-critical reflexivity of linguistically equipped entities―who, 
as communicatively interconnected subjects, form the public sphere―is an 
invaluable resource for discursively mediated forms of action coordination in 
the modern era. Dialogically created public spheres cannot exist without the 
critical reflection upon the socio-historical constitution of potentially uncritical 
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subjects. The rational-critical character of the modern public sphere is rooted in 
social actors’ capacity to engage in intersubjective discourse oriented towards 
the communicative coordination and normative regulation of social life. 
It is not irrelevant to note that the rational-critical analysis of the public 
sphere forms part of the rational-critical constitution of the public sphere. 
Hence, Habermas’s theory of the public sphere is situated in, and can be 
critiqued by, the public sphere itself. “His theory and his practice assume that 
critical debate is at the heart of all intellectual activity and every healthy public 
sphere, and it is clear that he expects his own writing to face the criticisms and 
contestations with which he regularly confronts his opponents” (Kramer 1992: 
256). Engagement in critical discourses, produced by prolific public spheres, 
is a constitutive element of modern social life. The normative potential of the 
bourgeois public sphere emanates from critical discursiveness able to question 
the taken-for-grantedness of accepted forms of quotidian experience. In this 
sense, the struggle over the creation of an emancipatory society “is a struggle 
to make publicity a source of reasoned, progressive consensus formation” 
(Calhoun 1992a: 28). The public sphere is a collective realm in which individuals’ 
cognitive ability to take on the role of critical and responsible actors is indicative 
of society’s coordinative capacity to transform itself into an emancipatory 
project shaped by the normative force of communicative rationality. 
 
 
(iii) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
 
 
The structural transformation of the public sphere can be considered as a 
manifestation of the historically contingent nature of social order. Both the rise 
and the potential demise of the public sphere indicate that the transformative 
potential of public realms of intersubjectivity cannot be separated from the 
developmental nature of society. Put differently, the transformation of the 
public sphere has to be examined in terms of the wider context of macro- 
structural transition processes. Thus, the history of the public sphere should 
not be treated as a free-floating development divorced from wider social 
processes; rather, it should be conceived of as integral to these processes 
(see Thompson 1995: 71). Questions remain, however, as to what the main 
features of the structural transformation of the public sphere are and why 
they are sociologically significant. 
According to Habermas, the structural transformation of the public sphere 
in the late twentieth century constitutes a process of social disintegration: “for 
about a century the social foundations of this sphere have been caught up in 
a process of decomposition. Tendencies pointing to the collapse of the public 
sphere are unmistakable, for while its scope is expanding impressively, its 
function has become progressively insignificant” (Habermas [1962] 1989: 
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4). It shall be argued here that, following the Habermasian analysis, there 
are three key interrelated tensions that lie at the heart of the decomposition 
process of the public sphere: (a) the tension between universal and particular 
interests, (b) the tension between communicative and instrumental reason, 
and (c) the tension between empowering and disempowering potentials. 
(a) The tension between universal and particular interests is symptomatic 
of the contradictory ideological character of the bourgeois public sphere. 
In essence, the normative discrepancy between the universalistic and the 
particularistic elements of the public sphere is due to the confusion of the 
emancipation of the homme with the emancipation of the bourgeois: “so easy was 
it at that time to identify political emancipation with ‘human’ emancipation” 
(ibid.: 56). If social emancipation is pursued in class-specific, rather than in 
class-transcending, terms, then the ideal of human emancipation is effectively 
reduced to the ideal of political emancipation. 
To be sure, Habermas’s awareness of the difference between the class- 
transcending emancipation of the homme and the class-specific emancipation 
of the bourgeois is embedded in both a Marxist and a post-Marxist view of 
modern society. Habermas’s conception of society is firmly situated within the 
tradition of Marxist thought in that it recognizes that political emancipation is 
not tantamount to human emancipation if it is defined in class-specific, rather 
than in species-constitutive, terms. At the same time, Habermas’s conception 
of society goes beyond the tradition of Marxist thought in that it suggests that 
the emancipatory potentials of the bourgeois public sphere, which stem from 
its rational-critical nature, cannot simply be denied by assuming, in an orthodox 
Marxist fashion, that knowledge production in the bourgeois public sphere 
is reducible to sheer ideology construction and, therefore, to the spread of 
“necessarily false consciousness”9: “Still, publicity...is apparently more and 
other than a mere scrap of liberal ideology” (Habermas [1962] 1989: 4). 
The constitution of the modern public sphere in capitalist societies is 
paradoxical due to its a priori openness as a “civic” realm oriented towards 
political inclusion and its de facto closure as a “bourgeois” realm based on 
social exclusion. To the extent that the discourses generated in the bourgeois 
public sphere are motivated by the dialogical exercise of critical perspective- 
taking, they can claim to represent, or at least seek to represent, the interests 
of society. To the extent that the discourses produced in the bourgeois public 
sphere are based on the perspective of the dominant class, they serve, first 
and foremost, the interests of a particular social group. In short, the tension 
between universal and particular interests can be considered as the first 
element that, because of its contradictory nature, has contributed to the 
steady degeneration of the bourgeois public sphere. 
 
9 See Marx and Engels ([1846] 2000/1977: 175 and 180). See also Haug (1999). 
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(b) The tension between communicative and instrumental reason is 
another source of friction that has substantially contributed to the gradual 
decomposition of the bourgeois public sphere. As Habermas reminds us, 
“[t]he fully developed bourgeois public sphere was based on the fictitious 
identity of the two roles assumed by the privatized individuals who came 
together to form a public: the role of property owners and the role of human 
beings pure and simple” (ibid.: 56; italics in original). In capitalist society, 
privatized individuals find themselves in the ambivalent position of taking 
on the role of the homme, capable of communicative reasoning, while aspiring 
to the role of the bourgeois, prone to instrumental reasoning (see ibid.: 55). 
“This ambivalence of the private sphere was also a feature of the public 
sphere” (ibid.; italics added), for the individuals who together form the 
public sphere are also part of the private sphere. Thus, we need to recognize 
the interwovenness of communicative and instrumental reason in both the 
private and the public spheres. Private individuals cannot break free from 
their immersion in the public sphere, just as public individuals cannot 
transcend their immersion in the private sphere. 
If the private sphere is identified with the intimate sphere of the conjugal 
family, on the one hand, and the realm of commodity exchange and social 
labor, on the other (ibid.: 39), then it is founded on a contradiction: its “private” 
idiosyncrasy not only depends on “the public”, but it is “public”. The public 
character of the private sphere manifests itself in the societal composition 
of the market. Although the commodity exchange of the market is based on 
private property owned by free citizens, a precondition for its existence is 
the construction of a public sphere through the power of social labour. In 
liberal-capitalist society, the public sphere constitutes not only a discursive 
realm of critical intersubjectivity, but also a purposive realm of commodified 
instrumentality. The sociological significance of both dimensions illustrates 
that what lies at the heart of the public sphere is a profound tension between 
communicative and instrumental reason: not only is the public created by 
socialized subjects who relate to one another in a forum sustained by 
processes of discursive communication and shaped by encounters of critical 
intersubjectivity, but it is also colonized by privatized objects that compete 
with one another in a market founded on mechanisms of systemic regulation 
and oriented towards profitable utility.10  Whereas the forum articulates the 
public interests of consensus-oriented subjects capable of communication, 
the market embodies the private interests of utility-driven subjects immersed 
in competition. From a Habermasian perspective, the tension between the 
critical force of communicative reason and the functional logic of instrumental 
reason  can  be  regarded  as  another  decisive factor  in  the  decomposition 
 
10 On the controversial relationship between “the market” and “the forum”, see, for 
instance, Elster (1986). 
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process of the modern public sphere. 
(c) The tension between the empowering and the disempowering potentials 
of the modern era is fundamental to Habermas’s account of the transformation 
of the public sphere. The sociological significance of this tension can hardly 
be overestimated, for it is indicative of the deep ambivalence of the normative 
potentials inherent in modern society. One significant paradox of the modern 
public sphere is that its continual expansion is closely associated with its 
gradual decomposition. Processes of social formation can anticipate processes 
of social deformation; mass democratization can lead to inflationary processes 
of political participation; social opening can result in ideological contraction. 
 
The  undermining  of  the  foundations  of  the  public  sphere  came  about…through  a 
“refeudalization” of society....State and society, once distinct, became interlocked. The 
public sphere was necessarily transformed as the distinction between public and 
private realms blurred, the equation between the intimate sphere and private life 
broke down with a polarization of family and economic society, rational-critical 
debate gave way to the consumption of culture (Calhoun 1992a: 21; italics added). 
 
In other words, there are two systemic realms that have decisively shaped the 
transformation of the public sphere: the state and the market. The former turns 
the public sphere into a social realm that is partly regulated by the functionalist 
logic of bureaucratic administration. The latter converts the public sphere 
into a social realm that is partly driven by the functionalist logic of capitalist 
commodification. The ubiquity of functionalist rationality poses a challenge 
to the possibility of human autonomy. In a world that is largely governed by 
the utility-driven power of functionalist rationality, the critical potential of a 
communicatively created public sphere is undermined by the steering capacity 
of a regulating state and a commodifying market. The systemic rationality 
spread by a regulating state and a commodifying market can degrade the critical 
potential of the public sphere to a decorative appendage of a disenchanted 
world. If reduced to a peripheral element of systemic steering processes, the 
public sphere degenerates into a state-regulated market sphere. 
The systemic functioning of late modern society is inconceivable without the 
standardization of the mass media. Driven by the instrumental imperatives of the 
culture industry, the mass media play a pivotal role in the systemic regulation of 
the public sphere. In principle, the rational-critical potential of the public sphere 
can be swallowed by the integrationist potential of the mass media: 
 
For the “culture” propagated by the mass media is a culture of integration….The 
public sphere assumes advertising functions. The more it can be deployed as a 
vehicle for political and economic propaganda, the more it becomes unpolitical 
as a whole and pseudo-privatized….To the extent that the public and private 
became intermeshed realms, this model became inapplicable (Habermas [1962] 
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1989: 175-176; italics added). 
 
The integrationist nature of the mass media transforms the public sphere 
into a functionalist appendage of political reformism. Class antagonism is 
perpetuated by the systemic integrationism of the mass media. Hence, a 
constitutive element of the bourgeois public sphere, namely its critical 
potential derived from reflection, seems to give way to the core component 
of the culture industry, that is, its tendency towards constant 
commodification: 
 
[M]ass media...themselves have become autonomous, to obtain the agreement 
or at least acquiescence of a mediatized public. Publicity is generated from 
above, so to speak, in order to create an aura of good will for certain positions. 
Originally publicity guaranteed the connection between rational-critical public 
debate and the legislative foundation of domination, including the critical 
supervision of its exercise. Now it makes possible the peculiar ambivalence 
of a domination exercised through the domination of nonpublic opinion: it 
serves the manipulation of the public as much as legitimation before it. Critical 
publicity is supplanted by manipulative publicity (ibid.: 177-178; italics in 
original). 
 
The communicative rationality inherent in the public sphere can be colonized 
by the functionalist rationality inherent in the state and the economy. Generally, 
this colonization process is not openly challenged but surreptitiously legitimated 
by the “bourgeois” mass media. The colonization of the lifeworld by the system11 
is reinforced, rather than undermined, by the mass media. Under conditions 
of late modernity, then, it is not the system that is shaped by the lifeworld, 
but, on the contrary, the lifeworld that is colonized by the system. In short, the 
tension between the emancipatory nature of communicative rationality and 
the instrumental nature of purposive rationality poses a significant challenge 
to the organization of modern public spheres. 
 
 
III. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
ON HABERMAS’S THEORY OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Habermas’s theory of the public sphere has been extensively discussed in the 
literature.12  It is because of, rather than despite, the fact that the Habermasian 
 
11 For an excellent analysis of the relationship between “lifeworld” and “system”, see Peters 
(1993: 557-560). See also, for example, Susen (2007: 61-73; 2009a: 86, 106). 
12 On Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, see, for instance, Habermas ([1962] 1989; 1992; 
1995). In the secondary literature, see, for example: Calhoun (1992a), Crossley & Roberts (2004), 
Forester (1985), Gardniner (2004), Goode (2005), Holub (1991), Kelly (2004), Kögler (2005), Mar- 
tin (2005), Negt & Kluge ([1972] 1993), Rochlitz (2002), Sintomer (2005), and Voirol (2003). 
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account of the public sphere has been highly influential that it has been criticized 
in numerous ways. Hence, the multifaceted forms of criticism levelled against 
Habermas’s theory of the public sphere should not be one-sidedly interpreted 
as evidence of its analytical weakness and explanatory inadequacy; rather, they 
should be considered indicative of the fact that Habermas provides a useful and 
insightful theoretical framework for understanding the structural transformation 
of the public sphere in the modern period. Notwithstanding its considerable 
merits, it is essential to be aware of the analytical limitations of Habermas’s 
theory of the public sphere. It is the purpose of this section to shed light on the 
key shortcomings of Habermas’s approach to the structural transformation of 
the public sphere and thereby illustrate that his account needs to be substantially 
revised if it is to serve as a theoretical framework for understanding the increasing 
complexity of public spheres in advanced societies. 
(a) Habermas’s analysis of the public sphere can be criticized for centring 
almost exclusively on the nature of bourgeois public life (bürgerliche 
Öffentlichkeit). To reduce the complexity of the modern public sphere to the 
singularity of the bourgeois public sphere means to underestimate the 
sociological significance of alternative―i.e. non-bourgeois―collective realms 
that contribute to a rational-critical engagement with the world. Although 
Habermas is aware of the class-specific nature of the bourgeois public 
sphere, “he neglects the importance of the contemporaneous development 
of a plebeian public sphere alongside and in opposition to the bourgeois public 
sphere, a sphere built upon different institutional forms” (Garnham 1992: 359; 
italics added).13 An analysis that is limited to the study of the bourgeois 
public sphere runs the risk of excluding other, equally important, public 
spheres from the picture. The consolidation of the bourgeois public sphere is 
paradoxical in that it promotes a discourse of universal interests of human 
beings, while in practice serving the particular interests of the dominant 
groups in society: 
 
A discourse of publicity touting accessibility, rationality, and the suspension of 
status hierarchies is itself deployed as a strategy of distinction (Fraser 1992: 115; 
italics added).14 
 
Put differently, the claim to universality of bourgeois public discourse― 
expressed in the slogan of the French Revolution: “liberté, égalité, fraternité”― 
 
13 On this problem, see also Calhoun (1992b: 5), Dahlgren (1991: 6), Fraser (1992: 111-112), 
Golding & Murdocl (1991: 22), Habermas (1992: 425-429), and Ku (2000: 220). 
14 See also Fraser (1992: 117): “...the official bourgeois public sphere is the institutional 
vehicle for a major historical transformation in the nature of political domination. This is 
the shift from a repressive mode of domination to a hegemonic one, from rule based 
primarily on acquiescence to superior force to rule based primarily on consent 
supplemented with some measure of repression.” 
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remains trapped in the pursuit of class-specific interests. For the politics of 
universality advocated by the bourgeois public sphere represents, above all, 
the particular interests of the dominant class, even if it claims to embody the 
general interests of humanity. The liberté bourgeoise is defined primarily in terms 
of negative freedom as in “freedom from”, rather than in terms of positive 
freedom as in “freedom to”. The égalité bourgeoise is, first and foremost, an 
equality of opportunity as a formal right, rather than an equality of outcome as 
a substantive entitlement. The fraternité bourgeoise is, in practice, an exclusive 
type of competitive solidarity between privileged social groups, rather than 
an inclusive form of unconditional solidarity between all human beings. To 
reduce the analysis of the modern public sphere to an examination of social 
realms generated and controlled by dominant classes means to leave aside 
collective spaces created and shaped by other social groups, whose existence 
and influence play a pivotal role in the construction of modern public life. 
(b) Habermas presents a somewhat idealistic picture of the public sphere. 
Given his one-sided emphasis on the fact that the bourgeois public sphere 
possesses a “rational-critical”15 character, he tends to overestimate the 
significance of the emancipatory features of modern public life and therefore 
underestimate the influence of its repressive elements. As Habermas self- 
critically acknowledges, it is 
 
…tempting to idealize the bourgeois public sphere in a manner going way 
beyond any methodologically legitimate idealization of the sort involved in 
ideal-typical conceptualization (Habermas 1992: 442; italics added). 
 
The public sphere is no less permeated by power relations than society as a 
whole. The power-laden nature of publicity is impregnated with the stratified 
constitution of society. The ideological nature of public discourses is embedded 
in the material organization of social resources. The symbolic resources of critique 
are always dependent on the social resources of power. The vertical structuration 
of society manifests itself in the interest-laden structuration of ideology: socially 
positioned subjects produce relationally contingent discourses. The hegemonic 
discourses generated within the bourgeois public sphere express the particular 
interests of the most powerful social groups. The discourses of educated, 
wealthy, mostly white, and predominantly male elites reflect the specific 
interests of the privileged sectors of society (see Thompson 1995: 72). To idealize 
the public sphere as a communicative realm of rational-critical intersubjectivity 
means to underestimate the substantive impact of interest-laden hierarchies on 
the constitution of communicative interactions in stratified societies. 
(c)  Habermas’s  account  of  the  public  sphere  is  largely  gender-blind. 
 
15 See, for example, Habermas ([1962] 1989: 28, 176, 178, 179). 
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Nevertheless, in his response to the objections raised by feminist critics, 
Habermas admits that the patriarchal nature of modern European public 
spheres can hardly be ignored: 
 
…the growing feminist literature has sensitized our awareness to the patriarchal 
character of the public sphere itself (Habermas 1992: 427; italics added).16 
 
Gender inequality, which  in  most  Western  societies  manifests  itself 
in heterosexist and masculinist forms of normativity, is not a peripheral 
phenomenon but a central element of modern public spheres. The 
marginalization of women within the modern public sphere as well as their 
de facto exclusion from particular―for example, religiously defined―positions 
of power can be seen as an expression of the patriarchal character of society 
in general and as an extension of the patriarchal character of the bourgeois 
family in particular. To account for the normative significance of the gendered 
division of power in modern society requires acknowledging that modern 
public spheres cannot escape the ubiquity of materially and discursively 
constructed forms of patriarchy.17 
(d) In a similar vein, Habermas’s analysis of the public sphere is based 
on overly rationalistic assumptions. As such, it stands in the tradition of a 
male-dominated social theory, putting forward what feminists describe as 
“malestream” conceptions of the social world and social development: 
 
[Habermas’s] interpretation underlies an overly rationalistic conception of public 
culture within a republican model that builds upon the Enlightenment ideal of 
rationalism (Ku 2000: 221; italics added). 
 
The idea that the bourgeois public sphere is dominated by the continuous 
production of rational-critical discourses that endow society with an 
emancipatory potential rests on the short-sighted view that we can, and 
should, privilege rational over non-rational forms of engaging with the 
world. To be sure, it is possible to question such a rationalistic conception of 
human actors without denying that rationality can, and often does, constitute 
a crucial source of social emancipation. We need to recognize, however, that 
neo-Kantian approaches, which rightly insist upon the empowering resources 
of rationality, tend to underestimate the social complexity arising from public 
forms of intersubjectivity, whose variegated nature transcends the realm of 
reason-guided forms of normativity. Various cultural forms—such as art, 
music, dance, and painting—derive their emancipatory potential from their 
 
16 See also Johnson (2001). 
17 On the gendered nature of the public sphere, see, for example, Brettschneider (2007), Cam- 
eron (1998), Moore (2003), and Rendall (1999). 
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ability to rise above the seemingly disembodied realm of reason. 
(e) Habermas’s theory of the public sphere is problematic in that it promotes 
a universalistic conception of public interest founded on a monolithic account 
of public life. The assumption that the bourgeois public sphere represents the 
public sphere of the contemporary world par excellence is both conceptually 
and empirically reductive. For such a view fails to take into account the fact that 
modern society contains a multiplicity of simultaneously existing, and often 
competing, public spheres. The increasing pluralization of modern public 
spheres reflects the growing differentiation of complex societies. Modern 
public spheres are differentiated and stratified realms of interaction and, 
as such, they are inhabited by various social groups, some of which occupy 
subordinate positions in society: members of the working classes, political 
minorities, ethnic minorities, religious minorities, and sexual minorities―to 
mention just a few of these groups. Social groups that are excluded from 
sharing the monopoly of symbolic violence in a given society have an 
interest in creating alternative public spheres that are materially sustained 
by counter-hegemonic practices and ideologically legitimated by counter- 
hegemonic discourses. The empowering potentials of alternative public 
spheres emanate from their capacity to challenge the legitimacy of dominant 
practices and dominant discourses by creating counter-hegemonic realms 
based on alternative practices and alternative discourses. Hegemonies need 
to be continuously re-hegemonized in order to ensure that they are not de- 
hegemonized. Counter-hegemonies need to be constantly de-hegemonized 
in order to avoid becoming hegemonized. Alternative public spheres, then, 
can be characterized as 
 
subaltern  counterpublics  in  order  to  signal  that  they  are  parallel  discursive 
arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate 
counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, 
interests, and needs (Fraser 1992: 123; italics in original). 
 
To eclipse the possibility of constructing polycentric public spheres means 
to  ignore  the  normative  potentials  of  radical  pluralism  emanating  from 
the competition between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic practices and 
discourses in different public realms.18 
(f) Habermas’s socio-historical analysis of the modern world is based 
on the dichotomous distinction between the public and the private. Yet, as 
explained above, the distinction between the public and the private should be 
regarded as an analytical, rather than an empirical, separation, since society 
 
18 On Habermas’s remarks on the construction of polycentric public spheres, see, for ex- 
ample, Habermas (1992: 440). See also Ku (2000: 221), Robbins (1993: xvii), and Thompson 
(1995: 71). 
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is a conglomerate of relationally constructed realms whose boundaries are far 
from clear: 
 
In general, critical theory needs to take a harder, more critical look at the terms 
“private” and “public”. These terms, after all, are not simply straightforward 
designations of societal spheres (Fraser 1992: 131). 
 
The conceptual distinction between the public and the private is relatively 
arbitrary in that public realms are generated by private subjects, just as private 
realms are composed of public subjects. Indeed, the construction of all social 
realms is contingent upon the interaction of private and public subjects. 
Whatever the degree of structural differentiation of a given social formation, 
the interrelatedness of social realms stems from the interconnectedness of 
social actions. To the extent that the construction of social realms derives from 
the realization of social actions, the very possibility of human coexistence 
depends upon the consolidation of social structures. Social structures 
without human actions are tantamount to societies without subjects. Insofar 
as human actors are both private and public subjects, their multi-contextual 
actions transcend the public/private antinomy and thereby contribute to the 
pluralized construction of social reality. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The critical study of the public sphere is central to a sociological 
understanding of the emancipatory potentials inherent in the communicative 
processes of modern society. Habermas’s social theory provides astute insights 
into the normative constitution and structural transformation of the public 
sphere in the modern era. Far from being reducible to an autopoietic realm 
of self-referential debate, the public sphere plays a pivotal role in providing 
a forum for deliberative processes aimed at the democratic construction of 
society. Indeed, the development of social life in the modern era is shaped 
by both the normative opportunities and the normative limitations of public 
discourses. The sociological importance of the public/private dichotomy is 
reflected not only in the fact that it has been widely discussed in the literature 
but also, more importantly, in the fact that the separation between public and 
private realms is fundamental to the construction of modern liberal societies. 
The first section of this paper has critically examined the public/private 
dichotomy in terms of its historical and sociological significance. The 
historical variability of the public/private dichotomy manifests itself in its 
material and ideological contingency: its material contingency is due to the 
fact that different societies produce different forms of public and private life; 
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its ideological contingency is due to the fact that different societies generate 
different discourses about the nature of public and private life. In short, both 
realities of and ideas about the relationship between the public and the private 
vary over time and between different societies. 
The analysis of the ontology of the public/private dichotomy is concerned 
with the question of what the conceptual separation between the public and 
the private actually stands for. As elucidated above, three distinctions are 
particularly important in this regard. 
(a) The distinction between society and individual refers to the difference 
between “the collective” and “the personal”. By definition, the social sciences 
tend to privilege “the social” over “the individual” and, consequently, 
conceive of both the public and the private in relational terms. 
(b) The distinction between visibility and concealment designates the 
difference between “the transparent” and “the opaque”. It is the historical 
mission of an active and democratic public sphere to ensure that the exercise of 
state power can claim legitimacy only to the extent that its social acceptability 
is subject to governmental transparency and public accountability. 
(c) The distinction between openness and closure relates to the difference 
between “the accessible” and “the sealed”. Yet, just as public institutions― 
such as the state―are rarely completely open, private institutions―such as 
the family―are not structurally detached but socially embedded. Thus, the 
“grand dichotomy” between the public and the private hinges on an ideal- 
typical distinction whose analytical validity needs to be measured in terms of 
its empirical applicability. 
The second section of this paper has sought to shed light on Habermas’s 
theory of the public sphere. As demonstrated above, Habermas’s account 
of the public sphere is highly complex, and the foregoing analysis has by 
no means aimed to provide a comprehensive picture of its constitutive 
elements and presuppositions. Rather, this paper has focused on three main 
dimensions: (i) the concept of the public sphere, (ii) the normative specificity 
of the bourgeois public sphere, and (iii) the structural transformation of the 
public sphere in the modern era. 
(i) According to Habermas, the public sphere constitutes an intersubjectively 
constructed realm of linguistically equipped and discursively engaged 
individuals. Mediating between systemic imperatives imposed “from above” 
and normative concerns articulated “from below”, the modern public sphere 
emerged as a tension-laden realm between state and society. As such, it is 
structurally divided between two diametrically opposed forms of rationality: 
functionalist rationality, which underlies systemic mechanisms of steering 
and regulation, and communicative rationality, which is mobilized by actors 
capable of intersubjective speech, purposive reflection, and deliberative action. 
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(ii) The normative specificity of the bourgeois public sphere stems from 
the fact that, in principle, it constitutes an empowering realm of social 
interaction. As argued above, its emancipatory potential is threefold and 
manifests itself in (a) its ideological opposition to arbitrary forms of power, 
(b) its scrutinizing function in relation to the political legitimacy of modern 
states, and (c) its reflective engagement with public forms of reasoning. 
Ultimately, the emancipatory potential of the public sphere is located in the 
rational-critical resources of linguistically interacting subjects. The public 
sphere is inconceivable without people’s capacity to overcome the normative 
limitations of individualistic societies through the coordinative power of 
socialized and socializing individuals. 
(iii) From a Habermasian perspective, the structural transformation of the 
public sphere in the late twentieth century constitutes a process of social 
disintegration. As argued above, three fundamental tensions underlying this 
process of gradual decomposition can be identified. (a) The tension between 
universal and particular interests lies at the heart of the modern public sphere. 
Rhetorical claims to universality cannot always conceal their interest-laden 
particularity. (b) In a similar vein, the tension between communicative and 
instrumental reason illustrates that, in liberal-capitalist society, the public 
sphere constitutes not only a discursive realm of critical intersubjectivity, 
but also a purposive realm of commodified instrumentality. To the extent 
that debating forums generate rational-critical public spheres, profit-driven 
markets produce commodified public spheres. (c) The tension between 
empowering and disempowering potentials is crucial to Habermas’s critical 
conception of modern society. Paradoxically, the increasing expansion of the 
public sphere has contributed to its gradual decomposition. The 
commodifying imperative of capitalist society appears to transform the 
public sphere into a market sphere. If left unchallenged, the “invisible hand” 
of the market and the “visible hand” of the state seem strong enough to 
neutralize the rational- critical force of the public. 
The third section of this paper has examined some of the main shortcomings 
of Habermas’s theory of the public sphere. (a) It is bourgeois-centric in that 
it focuses almost exclusively on the hegemonic public sphere of the ruling 
class, thereby underestimating the social and political significance of 
alternative public spheres. (b) It is idealistic in that it tends to overestimate 
the  emancipatory  potentials  of  liberal  public  discourse.  (c)  It  is  gender- 
blind in that it does not account for the impact of sexist discrimination on 
the development of public life in modern society. (d) It is overly rationalistic 
in that it conceives of communicative rationality as the key emancipatory 
driving force of human interaction. (e) It advocates a universalistic conception 
of public interests, thereby neglecting the fact that advanced societies are 
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composed of a multiplicity of competing, and often counter-hegemonic, 
public spheres. (f) Its dichotomous view of the social fails to question the 
validity of the binary distinction between the public and the private. It is 
difficult to study modern public spheres without drawing on Habermas, but it 
is impossible to understand the transformation of late modern public spheres 
without going beyond his conceptual framework. If the above shortcomings 
are seriously addressed, Habermas’s theory of the public sphere may serve as 
an analytical basis for confronting the normative challenges arising from the 
material and symbolic complexities of advanced societies. 
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